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63-70
Kaht's position 6n <Hilma!, has been
abiy treateeJ in the recent past. 1
UnfortuHately,
Hoff does. hot cite
these treatments, ahd spends mucH of
tier time. repeating what has gone on
blHdt-e: for Kant we have no direct
dUti~s to animals sihce they are not

rational or self-conscious or capable of
moral legislation; animals are therefore
means only or things, and although it
is useful for us to act as if We have
duties to . animals, this is only a sign
of respect for humanity, since being
cruel . to
animals makes
us
more

94
inclined to be cruel to human beings.
As Broadie and Pybus put it: "Having
ceremoniously ushered animals out of
the front door of the moral universe,
Kant has, with commendable discre
tion, tried to smuggle them in again
through the back. "2
Broadie and
Pybus have also previously alerted us
to the fact that this Kantian view is
evidenced in the Lectures on Ethics,
the Groundwork, and (unmentioned by
Hoff) the Metaphysics of Morals.
And
Broadie, Pybus, and Regan have pre
viously criticized Kant's position on
animals, as does Hoff.
What does Hoff tell us that is new?
She ma kes much of the fact that the
first formulation of the categorical
imperative makes
no mention of a
moral domain.
Only in the second
formulation,
which
she
calls
the
"humanistic imperative," is the com
munity of moral subjects limited to
rational beings.
Hoff implies,
but
does not state, that Kant could have
had an ethics
of universalizability
without being a speciesist, but it is
by no means clear that this is her
view.
At one point
(p.
68)
she
implies that she is an intuitionist when
she states regarding Kant's humanism
that "In the absence of good argu
ments in favor of a dogmatic and
exclusive humanism, we may trust our
moral intuitions."
The "common moral
intuition" she refers to is that suffer
ing is an evil, and it is wrong to
gratuitously and deliberately inflict it
on animal s (p. 67) .
This is fine as
far as it goes, but one wishes that
Hoff would have treated equally com
mon intuitions regarding animals, and
perhaps conflicting ones, e.g., that
meat-eating is legitimate.
I n addition to concentrating on the
differences between the first and sec
ond formulations of the categorical
imperative,
Hoff contributes to ou r
understanding of Kant's position on
animals
in
her treatment
of
"the
patient-agent parity thesis" (p. 69),

E&A IV/3
which suggests that the domai n of
moral agents coincides with that of
moral patients.
Kant holds this thesis
rega rding animals.
But if he aban
doned it regarding the mentally enfee
bled,
which seems likely, then he
would be inconsistent since the men
tally enfeebled are not rational, self
conscious, or moral legislators.
That
is, Kant could have learned a great
deal from what is now commonly called
the argument from marginal cases. J
Hoff concludes that the patient-agent
parity thesis must be rejected because
the domain of moral patients is much
la rger than that of moral agents.
Much more work needs to be done
on the relationship between Kant and
Kantianism, on the one hand, and
speciesism, on the other.
This is
why I have emphasized Hoff's redun
dancy.
Charles Hartshorne· gives us
some clues as to what might still be
done in this area. 4
The rationality
that Ka nt ta kes to be the p recond ition
of value is not the absolute thing in
human beings that he takes it to be.
If there is an absolute quality of
rationality that a higher animal lacks,
then a human being lacks it as well.
Kant says 5 that only a rational will
that acts according to its rationality is
intrinsically . or
unqualifiedly
good.
But he also admits that human beings
so act only imperfectly or incom
pletely.
On Iy God always and enti rely
conforms
to
rational
requirements.
From this point of view no animal, not
even a human being, is really an end
in itself.
In the sense in which any
animal has intrinsic value, for Harts
horne, all an imals have some of it,
and the differences are matters of
degree.
The really significant differ
ence,
as
Hartshorne
sees
it,
is
between any animal and the Everlast
ing.
That is, although Hoff's treatment
of intrinsic value in animals is well
done, more thought has to be given to
the
extent
of
Kant's
invidious
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humanism: it causes him not only to
treat
unfavorably
any
bei ngs

"beneath" human beings, but also any
possible bei ng above human beings.

Daniel A. Dombrowski
Creighton University
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This argument can be found,
among other places, in Tom Regan,
"Fox's Critique of Animal Liberation,"
Ethics 88 (Jan., 1978): 126-133.
To
the possible objection that this argu
argument was beyond anything that Kant
could have thought of in the eight
eighteenth century, it should be noted that
the argument was discovered in anti
antiquity. See my "Vegetarianism and the
Argument from Marginal Cases in Por
Porphyry," to appear in 1984 in the
Journal of the History of Ideas.
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Acropolis Press, 1978), pp. 170-171; "The
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Kant's view that
we do not have direct duties to ani
animals, only indirect ones, is not solely
due
to
his
rationalism,
as
Hoff
implies. It may also be due to Chris
Christian influences on him; St. Thomas
Aqui nas held a similar view.
See
Summa Contra Gentiles, Th i rd Book,
Part II, Chapter CXII.
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